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2009
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Ceuta is a Spanish enclave in North Africa, and an autonomous city, by the Strait of Gibraltar. It is near Algeciras and the British colony of Gibraltar (both on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean). Its name comes from the Arabic Sebta, which etymologically derives from the Latin Septem Fratres, a name given by the Romans to the hills on which the city was built.
Ceuta has always been prosperous thanks to its location. Because of its privileged position it was a very coveted city and was dominated by several peoples (Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines). In the beginning of the 8th century it was taken by the Arabian troops and became an important point of entrance for the armies which invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711.
On 21 August 1415, the city of Ceuta was conquered by the Portuguese. The reasons that led to this enterprise are still today a controversial subject in Portuguese historiography.
Dom João I needed a grandiose action that would help forget the moral taint of his illegitimate origin. When the war with Castile ended, the conquest of the Algarve beyond the Sea [the name given to the Portuguese territories in Northern Africa] seemed the best way for Portugal and its new dynasty to gain power (and it would help protect the southern border of the country as well). It was important to conquer new territories, in strategic points, to balance the powers in the Iberian Peninsula, especially the relationship between Castile and Portugal.
According to the chronicler Zurara, the conquest of Ceuta was suggested by the treasurer João Afonso de Alenquer. His choice was based on the attraction for the ports of Maghreb, for the gold of Sudan and for other African riches. Ceuta was an important enclave which controlled the trade between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The treasurer's project was approved by princes Duarte, Pedro and Henrique, as well as by their older brother, the Count of Braganza, a well travelled man, aware of the international situation.
The conquest of Ceuta also fulfilled the need to keep the aristocracy busy, for it had been the big machinery of war in the fights against Castile and was now unoccupied, which led them either to leave the kingdom or to cause internal disturbances. There was also, obviously, a religious question: Europe lived under the dominion of a universalist religion with expansionist goals which saw in the war against Islam a way to serve God. The attack on Ceuta was prepared in advance and in secrecy. In 1411, King João I had asked the antipope John XXIII for the help of the military orders in the war against the Muslims. A year latter, prior do Hospital [name given to the Portuguese chief religious officer of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta] D. Álvaro Gonçalves Camelo and Captain Afonso Furtado were sent on an embassy to Sicily. Their main purpose was to pass by Ceuta to gather information about the possibility of an attack. By then the vessels for the fleet were already being chartered: 15 galleons and some foists. To conceal the preparations, some rumours were spread about a tournament, where the king would knight his sons and about the possibility of a Portuguese attack on the Duke of Holland (who collaborated by bitterly discharging the Portuguese ambassador).
The princes were responsible for recruiting the population and gathering the financial means from north to south of the country: the Count of Barcelos organized the men from Entre Douro e Minho, prince Henry the ones from Trás-os-Montes (who left from Oporto) and prince Pedro was responsible for the ones from Estremadura, Além Tejo and Guadiana and the Algarve. Prince Duarte was in charge of ruling the kingdom so that the king could concentrate on preparing the fleet and the artillery.
Queen Filipa of Lancastre died from the plague just before the departure, which caused some voices to rise against the enterprise. The landing at Ceuta took place on 21 August, with no great loss of men. The Muslims were unprepared and didn't have enough people to face the Portuguese machinery of war.
Days latter, after attending the mess at the mosque, converted to a church, princes Duarte, Pedro and Henrique were knighted by the king.
After gathering his council, the king decided to hold the place. An important question arose then: who would stay in command of the garrison? King John I asked the Constable Dom Nuno Álvares Pereira, the Marshal Vasquez Coutinho and Dom Martim Afonso de Melo, who all refused. The Moroccan place included countless dangers Portuguese noblemen were not willing to face. However, to Dom Pedro de Meneses, Ceuta was a great opportunity to regain the lost prestige of his lineage.
To Dom Pedro de Meneses, however, the captaincy was a challenging chore and an opportunity to regain his honor and his prestige. He was appointed captain, with the support of prince Duarte (Dom Pedro de Meneses was his ensign) and of Dom Lopo Dias de Sousa, Master of the Order of Christ.
The donatory captain was responsible for the administration of the place, the king having conferred all his power to him - civil and criminal jurisdiction, political, administrative, fiscal and military powers, with the authority to apply penalties, including death penalties. He also had the power to donate houses and land in and around the city of Ceuta which had not yet been donated by the king. He was entitled to a fifth of the spoils obtain in sea or on land.
When he left, the king promised to return the following year, in March, but he never did. He left behind some provisions, the promise of a regular provisioning, and a garrison of 2500 soldiers.
This garrison learned to fight in a kind of war it was not used to. First, the defence of the city had to be improved. The place was only occupied within the walls. The surroundings were used for firewood collecting, livestock grazing and to organize some cultivated fields, although the outcome of the crops were uncertain, for these could be destroyed or stolen by the Muslims. Using a technique called "segurar o campo", consisting of a complex system of watchmen and scouts, it was possible to secure the surroundings of the place during the day. The donatory captain also created a no man's land around Ceuta, by systematically attacking the neighbouring villages.
Three years after the Portuguese conquest, the king of Fez reacted. In 1418, Ceuta was submitted to a siege. Thanks to the artillery and the Portuguese crossbowmen, the siege only lasted for five days. In 1419 there was a new siege, this time laid by the King of Granada. Dom Pedro de Meneses had been warned beforehand and was able to prepare the defence of the city and ask King João I to send for help.
Although the capture of Ceuta was a success, Portugal soon realized it would be difficult to keep a Christian colony in Muslim territory. There was a permanent state of war. The place depended entirely on the kingdom to provide for its maintenance and both human and material costs were too high, and cereal supply was frequently handed to Portuguese and foreigners who were hired to get the wheat from Castile, Sicily or elsewhere.
After the capture of Ceuta in 1415, the Portuguese did not attack Moroccan territory until 1437, when the disastrous expedition to Tangier took place. During this time, the Portuguese presence in Ceuta and the conquest of North Africa (or Granada) were discussed by the royal family and its advisors. Ceuta, the only point of Christendom in Moorish territory, was perceived by them as waste of people and money and they though the kingdom could not afford to keep another place under the same conditions. After the failure at Tangier, the Muslims demanded the surrendering of Ceuta as a condition to free Prince Fernando. The city only became secure after the conquest of Ksar-el-Kebir, in 1458 and of Arzila and Tangier in 1471.
During the Philippine Dynasty (from 1581 to 1640) Ceuta, as well as Tangier and Mazagan kept a Portuguese administration. However, in 1640, when the Portuguese Restoration of Independence took place, Ceuta did not accept the Duke of Braganza, Dom João II, as its king, and became Spanish.
In 1668, in the Treaty of Lisbon, the two countries made Ceuta's situation official and it became a Spanish territory. To this day, Ceuta keeps the original flag, with white and black pieces (like the flag of Lisbon) with the Portuguese shield in the middle.
Bibliography:
BRAGA, Isabel R. Mendes Drumond; BRAGA, Paulo Drumond, Ceuta Portuguesa, Ceuta, Instituto de Estudios Ceutíes, 1998. BRAGA, Paulo Drumond, «A Expansão no Norte de África», in Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa, dir. de Joel Serrão e A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Vol. II, A Expansão Quatrocentista, Editorial Estampa, 1998, pp. 237-360. DUARTE, Luís Miguel, «África», in Nova História Militar de Portugal, dir. de Themudo Barata e Nuno Severiano Teixeira, vol. I, Lisboa, Circulo de Leitores, 2003, pp. 392-441. CARO, Lucas, Historia de Ceuta, transcrição, introdução e notas de José Luís Gomuz Barceló, Ceuta, Ayuntamiento de Ceuta, 1989. MASCARENHAS, Jerónimo de, Historia de la Ciudad de Ceuta, Málaga/Ceuta, Instituto de Estudios Ceutís, 1995. Translated by: Dominique Faria
Ceuta has always been prosperous thanks to its location. Because of its privileged position it was a very coveted city and was dominated by several peoples (Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines). In the beginning of the 8th century it was taken by the Arabian troops and became an important point of entrance for the armies which invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711.
On 21 August 1415, the city of Ceuta was conquered by the Portuguese. The reasons that led to this enterprise are still today a controversial subject in Portuguese historiography.
Dom João I needed a grandiose action that would help forget the moral taint of his illegitimate origin. When the war with Castile ended, the conquest of the Algarve beyond the Sea [the name given to the Portuguese territories in Northern Africa] seemed the best way for Portugal and its new dynasty to gain power (and it would help protect the southern border of the country as well). It was important to conquer new territories, in strategic points, to balance the powers in the Iberian Peninsula, especially the relationship between Castile and Portugal.
According to the chronicler Zurara, the conquest of Ceuta was suggested by the treasurer João Afonso de Alenquer. His choice was based on the attraction for the ports of Maghreb, for the gold of Sudan and for other African riches. Ceuta was an important enclave which controlled the trade between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The treasurer's project was approved by princes Duarte, Pedro and Henrique, as well as by their older brother, the Count of Braganza, a well travelled man, aware of the international situation.
The conquest of Ceuta also fulfilled the need to keep the aristocracy busy, for it had been the big machinery of war in the fights against Castile and was now unoccupied, which led them either to leave the kingdom or to cause internal disturbances. There was also, obviously, a religious question: Europe lived under the dominion of a universalist religion with expansionist goals which saw in the war against Islam a way to serve God. The attack on Ceuta was prepared in advance and in secrecy. In 1411, King João I had asked the antipope John XXIII for the help of the military orders in the war against the Muslims. A year latter, prior do Hospital [name given to the Portuguese chief religious officer of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta] D. Álvaro Gonçalves Camelo and Captain Afonso Furtado were sent on an embassy to Sicily. Their main purpose was to pass by Ceuta to gather information about the possibility of an attack. By then the vessels for the fleet were already being chartered: 15 galleons and some foists. To conceal the preparations, some rumours were spread about a tournament, where the king would knight his sons and about the possibility of a Portuguese attack on the Duke of Holland (who collaborated by bitterly discharging the Portuguese ambassador).
The princes were responsible for recruiting the population and gathering the financial means from north to south of the country: the Count of Barcelos organized the men from Entre Douro e Minho, prince Henry the ones from Trás-os-Montes (who left from Oporto) and prince Pedro was responsible for the ones from Estremadura, Além Tejo and Guadiana and the Algarve. Prince Duarte was in charge of ruling the kingdom so that the king could concentrate on preparing the fleet and the artillery.
Queen Filipa of Lancastre died from the plague just before the departure, which caused some voices to rise against the enterprise. The landing at Ceuta took place on 21 August, with no great loss of men. The Muslims were unprepared and didn't have enough people to face the Portuguese machinery of war.
Days latter, after attending the mess at the mosque, converted to a church, princes Duarte, Pedro and Henrique were knighted by the king.
After gathering his council, the king decided to hold the place. An important question arose then: who would stay in command of the garrison? King John I asked the Constable Dom Nuno Álvares Pereira, the Marshal Vasquez Coutinho and Dom Martim Afonso de Melo, who all refused. The Moroccan place included countless dangers Portuguese noblemen were not willing to face. However, to Dom Pedro de Meneses, Ceuta was a great opportunity to regain the lost prestige of his lineage.
To Dom Pedro de Meneses, however, the captaincy was a challenging chore and an opportunity to regain his honor and his prestige. He was appointed captain, with the support of prince Duarte (Dom Pedro de Meneses was his ensign) and of Dom Lopo Dias de Sousa, Master of the Order of Christ.
The donatory captain was responsible for the administration of the place, the king having conferred all his power to him - civil and criminal jurisdiction, political, administrative, fiscal and military powers, with the authority to apply penalties, including death penalties. He also had the power to donate houses and land in and around the city of Ceuta which had not yet been donated by the king. He was entitled to a fifth of the spoils obtain in sea or on land.
When he left, the king promised to return the following year, in March, but he never did. He left behind some provisions, the promise of a regular provisioning, and a garrison of 2500 soldiers.
This garrison learned to fight in a kind of war it was not used to. First, the defence of the city had to be improved. The place was only occupied within the walls. The surroundings were used for firewood collecting, livestock grazing and to organize some cultivated fields, although the outcome of the crops were uncertain, for these could be destroyed or stolen by the Muslims. Using a technique called "segurar o campo", consisting of a complex system of watchmen and scouts, it was possible to secure the surroundings of the place during the day. The donatory captain also created a no man's land around Ceuta, by systematically attacking the neighbouring villages.
Three years after the Portuguese conquest, the king of Fez reacted. In 1418, Ceuta was submitted to a siege. Thanks to the artillery and the Portuguese crossbowmen, the siege only lasted for five days. In 1419 there was a new siege, this time laid by the King of Granada. Dom Pedro de Meneses had been warned beforehand and was able to prepare the defence of the city and ask King João I to send for help.
Although the capture of Ceuta was a success, Portugal soon realized it would be difficult to keep a Christian colony in Muslim territory. There was a permanent state of war. The place depended entirely on the kingdom to provide for its maintenance and both human and material costs were too high, and cereal supply was frequently handed to Portuguese and foreigners who were hired to get the wheat from Castile, Sicily or elsewhere.
After the capture of Ceuta in 1415, the Portuguese did not attack Moroccan territory until 1437, when the disastrous expedition to Tangier took place. During this time, the Portuguese presence in Ceuta and the conquest of North Africa (or Granada) were discussed by the royal family and its advisors. Ceuta, the only point of Christendom in Moorish territory, was perceived by them as waste of people and money and they though the kingdom could not afford to keep another place under the same conditions. After the failure at Tangier, the Muslims demanded the surrendering of Ceuta as a condition to free Prince Fernando. The city only became secure after the conquest of Ksar-el-Kebir, in 1458 and of Arzila and Tangier in 1471.
During the Philippine Dynasty (from 1581 to 1640) Ceuta, as well as Tangier and Mazagan kept a Portuguese administration. However, in 1640, when the Portuguese Restoration of Independence took place, Ceuta did not accept the Duke of Braganza, Dom João II, as its king, and became Spanish.
In 1668, in the Treaty of Lisbon, the two countries made Ceuta's situation official and it became a Spanish territory. To this day, Ceuta keeps the original flag, with white and black pieces (like the flag of Lisbon) with the Portuguese shield in the middle.
Bibliography:
BRAGA, Isabel R. Mendes Drumond; BRAGA, Paulo Drumond, Ceuta Portuguesa, Ceuta, Instituto de Estudios Ceutíes, 1998. BRAGA, Paulo Drumond, «A Expansão no Norte de África», in Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa, dir. de Joel Serrão e A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Vol. II, A Expansão Quatrocentista, Editorial Estampa, 1998, pp. 237-360. DUARTE, Luís Miguel, «África», in Nova História Militar de Portugal, dir. de Themudo Barata e Nuno Severiano Teixeira, vol. I, Lisboa, Circulo de Leitores, 2003, pp. 392-441. CARO, Lucas, Historia de Ceuta, transcrição, introdução e notas de José Luís Gomuz Barceló, Ceuta, Ayuntamiento de Ceuta, 1989. MASCARENHAS, Jerónimo de, Historia de la Ciudad de Ceuta, Málaga/Ceuta, Instituto de Estudios Ceutís, 1995. Translated by: Dominique Faria