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2010
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Early Portuguese expansion in Morocco started in 1415 when troops commanded by Dom João I took the fortress at Ceuta, initiating a process of multisecular presence in Maghrebian territory. Though in the beginning the future directions for this new conquest were not clear, and the members of the Royal Council hesitated between either definitively occupying the area or sporadically sending expeditions without long-term objectives, in the end, this fortified stronghold would become a stepping-stone in a new scenario of overseas expansion. Ceuta´s geostrategic location at the entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar and the economic interests that such a position would arouse were certainly not foreign to this determination; however, other factors contributed to the decision to retain and manage the fortified stronghold. Living in an era of clear demographic expansion while going through a long period of peace with Castille, the new dinasty of ruling Portuguese nobility needed a space to demonstrate military valor and, consequently, assure the allocation of Royal rewards.

After a second Moroccan expedition which ended in failure (1432), the Crown would not again pursue the conquest of new fortified strongholds until Dom Afonso V´s reign; this was the period when Alcácer Ceguer (1458), Asilah, and Tangier (1471) were added to Algarve de Alem-mar, the name that designated the entire Portuguese dominion in North Africa. The increase in the territory raised a series of questions with the neighboring Kingdom of Castille, as the Castillian Crown also claimed control of a part of the Maghreb. Descending from the Visigothic monarchy, both crowns had legitimate aspirations to conquer the Moroccan territory, and only with the treaties of Alcaçovas-Toledo (1479-80) and Tordesillas (1494) could the question be definitively resolved, as the Kingdom of Fez became the defined area to which the Portuguese had rights of conquest. The climate of political fragmentation of the Moroccan sultanate during the Merinid and Wattasid dinasties allowed the Portuguese greater maneuvering space in their expansion process until the mid-sixteenth century, when the emergence of the Saadid sharifs in the country´s meridional regions imposed a redefiniton of geopolitical relationships.

If besides the ill-fated Graciosa expedition (1489) no events meriting any particular recognition occurred during Dom João II´s reign, the same cannot be said of his sucessor, Dom Manuel I, whose policies heralded greater capacity for intervention in the Maghreb. At the time of his ascending the throne, Dom Manuel had at his disposal a previously initiated line of expansion, which sustained Portuguese presence via military support in the northern fortified strongholds while simultaneously establishing a protective relationship with some coastal locations in the south, mainly with economic objectives. Portuguese presence in Morocco reached its peak early in the 16th century, especially with the occupation of Safi (1508), the conquest of Azemmour (1514), and the construction of fortresses in Mazagan (1502) and Santa Cruz of Cabo de Gue, near Agadir (1505). The progress to the South - which was greatly due to diplomatic contacts with the native populations and a politics of "protectorate" - allowed Portugal access to a geographical area distinct from the fortified strongholds of the Strait of Gibraltar region, to a vast area where the coastal towns enjoyed greater autonomy at quite a distance from the political center, Marrakesh, where the Portuguese establishment characteristically collaborated to a greater extent with the local population, comprised mainly of Berber tribes.

The instituting of "mouros de pazes" [peaceful Muslim] zones had the objectives of facilitating the establishment of Portuguese power in the region as well as of blocking the influence of the Kingdom of Fez and is worth noting. Conducted by Yahya Bentafuf and Nuno Fernandes de Ataíde, the incursions into the Moroccan hinterland on horseback had some impact on the documentation of this period. On the other hand, Dom Manuel I´s strategy focused particularly on control of the Moroccan waters, which led him to establish in 1520 the Armada of the Strait of Gibraltar, whose mission was precisely to ensure the navigation of Portuguese ships in face of the growing threats posed by Maghrebian and French corsairs.

The reign of Dom João III marked the end of the Portuguese expansionist strategy in Morocco. Before the sharifian conquests in the meridional regions - whose success was greatly due to the massive use of artillery as well as to the popularity of their ideological discourse against Christian occupancy - and in face of an endemic shortage of financial and human resources when resisting the Saadid armies required increased means of defense, the King had to make a choice regarding the policies for investment in the Crown´s different trends of expansion. The dilemma posed by the expensive maintenance of certain fortresses in Moroccan territory led the King, after consulting the influential individuals with the most experience in the matter, to decide to abandon the fortified strongholds of Safi and Azemmour (1541), and later those at Asilah and Alcacer Ceguer (1560). After the 1640 Portuguese Restoration War, the only fortress that remained under Portuguese control was Mazagan, until 1769; Ceuta opted to remain a possession of the Spanish Crown, and Tangier was ceded to the British Crown as dowry on the occasion of Princess Dona Catarina de Bragança´s marriage to Charles II of England (1662).

Daily life in the fortified North African strongholds was centered on economic activities and the frequent military expeditions to the areas surrounding the Portuguese-controlled regions. The population that lived in the fortresses was devoted to fishing, agricultural and horticultural production, commerce and, especially, to raising cattle, an essential activity for the survival of the garrisons. In fact, theft of cattle by both parties was quite common, giving rise to numerous skirmishes between Portuguese and Moroccan warriors. In addition to occasional operations of siege, military activities were limited mostly to facing the almogavarias, very fast armed incursions with specific objectives, a type of warfare adapted to the terrain and typical of the Moroccan military tradition. The fortress defense system depended greatly on a vigilance mechanism based on the role of the atalaias, scouts who kept watch over the surrounding area, assuring the safety of the strongholds by alerting the garrison in case of enemy threat. On the other hand, great armed conflicts in the open field, such as the battle of Ksar-el-Kibir (1578), were rare. Despite the climate of "endemic warfare," to use David Lopes´ famous expression, the moments of truce were not rare and relations with the Muslim territories around the Portuguese-controlled area were not limited solely to armed confrontation. For example, we know that the author of Anais de Arzila, Bernardo Rodrigues, had a friend in Larache, who usually stayed at his house when traveling to the Portuguese stronghold, and that the latter, in turn, housed the Portuguese chronicler when the former traveled to that Moroccan town.

Bibliography:
COOK, Weston, The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994; FARINHA, António Dias, Os Portugueses em Marrocos. Lisboa: Instituto Camões, 1999; LOPES, David, A Expansão em Marrocos. Lisboa: Teorema / O Jornal, [1989]; IDEM, Textos em Aljamia Portuguesa: Estudo filológico e histórico. Nova ed. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1940; RICARD, Robert, Études sur l'histoire des portugais au Maroc. Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1955; TERRASSE, Henri, Histoire du Maroc: Des origines à l'établissement du Protectorat français. 2 vols. Casablanca: Éditions Atlantides, 1949.

Translated by: Maria João Pimentel
Morocco
Image credit
André Teixeira