Publication Date
2011
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In general, privateering is an activity of maritime assault and combat that is commissioned by an institutional authority with the purpose of fighting against rival interests and retaliating similar aggressions. In this sense, privateering had an early start in Portugal, since maritime attacks against Moorish targets are known dating as soon as the 12th century. During the reign of King Dinis (1279-1325) this practice was overtly reinforced by the creation of the first formal apparatus of naval warfare, placed under the command of Admiral Manuel Pessanha, of Genovese descent. Besides this, the King mentioned the existence of privateers sponsored by the Crown.
Given both the geographical extension of the Portuguese commercial networks and the location of the main sites of Muslim opposition, placed in the North of Africa, Portuguese privateers were found to act in such diverse locations as the Alboran Sea (lying between the South of the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic coast of Morocco) and the Strait of Gibraltar or in the Western Mediterranean Sea.
The conquest of Ceuta, in 1415, increased the Portuguese privateers’ operating power. Several raiding missions are known to have left from that Moroccan port after being entrusted to fleets under the control of the fortress captain, Pedro de Meneses, as well as of the Portuguese princes Peter and Henry, to whom the Crown had bestowed legal powers for that particular purpose. The raiding spirit eventually presided over the birth of the Discoveries, since the successive ship crews sent by Prince Henry, from 1422 onward, charged with the task of passing Cape Bojador invariably made up the geostrategic failure by attacking Muslim vessels. Even after Gil Eanes had beaten the fear of the Cape in 1434, the privateer mood would prevail for another fourteen years, until Prince Henry decided that peaceful trade with the populations on the Western coast of Africa should replace the attacks launched against the villages. A new impetus to restore privateering would occur after Prince Henry’s death. Between 1475 and 1479, the exploration of the Atlantic and of the African coastline would give birth to further successful privateer raids by the Portuguese, now targeting Castilian ships which were met defying the Portuguese exclusive access to the region of Guinea.
The Treaty of Alcáçovas-Toledo (1479-1480) would settle the conflict and strengthen Portuguese hegemony and monopolist interests in South Atlantic waters. The pursuit of the Discoveries during the reign of King John II (1481-1495) had the major result of proving the plan of reaching India via a maritime passage along African Southeastern waters workable. King Manuel I had the good fortune to put it into action via the expedition commanded by Vasco da Gama (1497-1499).
In such a context, a new stage in the King’s commissioned privateer actions began to take shape. In fact, Gama’s success was uncontested on what concerned geographical exploratory incursions and coming across the main Indian centre of pepper trade (Calicut). However, the tense relations with the local sovereign and Islamic traders cast a shadow upon future bilateral relations. This scenario was aggravated by the fact that the main commercial routes of the Indian Ocean were under Islamic control and, therefore, highly adverse to Portuguese aspirations. That’s why Pedro Álvares Cabral, Admiral of the second Fleet sent by King Manuel I to India, in 1500, was instructed to intercept all Muslim sails.
By the end of his stay on the Indian subcontinent it had become evident that all Portuguese settlement efforts in the region would meet with warlike activities. King Manuel accepted the material and political costs of keeping and expanding the Portuguese presence in maritime Asia. As what was at stake was, in the long run, the commercial monopoly of Eastern spice trade, it was imperious to devise a strategy of maritime control. Vasco da Gama was charged with this duty, which led to the establishment of a Portuguese fleet operating on permanent terms in the West Indian Ocean, and originated a shipping pass system commonly known as cartaz (pl. cartazes), whereby licenses (letters of marque and reprisal) were granted to Portuguese allies; all the others would automatically become easy targets for Portuguese attack and arrest, due to the unmatched expertise in shipbuilding techniques and naval war tactics displayed by Portugal at the time.
A privateer “industry” was thus born in Asian waters. Particularly active in the first half of the 16th century, it played an important role in the formation and organization of Portuguese India, contributing to financial gains and, more importantly, to military and political achievements. The Crown assigned priority to attacks located on the maritime routes of the West Indian Ocean; on the Indian coastal waters of Malabar, from which most of the pepper trade was exported; on the waters surrounding the Maldives, where an alternative pepper route was developed from the island of Sumatra; on the routes leading to the Red Sea, to where converged ships sailing from the previous locations; and on the coast of Gujarat, where Muslim vessels from the Red Sea could be sighted. In the areas east of Cape Comorin and Ceylon island, Portugal adopted a more sensible approach, either for lack of means, due to a less expressive Muslim presence, or because it became evident that aggressive action would be incompatible with fruitful commercial relations.
Though privateer action served mainly political and strategic purposes, it nevertheless provided material gains and, therefore, encouraged the misuse of power. In spite of this, the Crown reserved for itself no more than 1/5 of the capture, the rest of the cargo being distributed among the officers and the crew members, according to rank. Several methods were implemented in order to spot and to prevent frauds: the existence of professionals exclusively tasked with supervising the confiscated cargo and its destination (military men, clerks and cargo administrators), the registry of all confiscated products in books kept for that purpose on board of the ships; the conduction of inquiries made to crew members after the ships arrived at Portuguese India. The problems, however, reached beyond the known cases of misappropriation of funds and goods, and went further than unlawful conduct by subaltern staff. Some of the King’s commanders, lured by the prospect of easy wealth, attacked vessels carrying letters of marquee, or blatantly disrespected the mission that they had been trusted with, engaging in maritime capture, and therefore displaying the existence of a deep chasm between private and governmental interests.
Bibliography:
PELÚCIA, Alexandra, Corsários e Piratas Portugueses. Aventureiros nos Mares da Ásia, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros, 2010. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe F. R., «Do Cabo Espichel a Macau: Vicissitudes do Corso Português», in As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. Actas do VI Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa (Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de 1991), eds. Artur Teodoro de Matos e Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, Macau-Lisboa, s.n., 1993, pp. 537-568.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva
Given both the geographical extension of the Portuguese commercial networks and the location of the main sites of Muslim opposition, placed in the North of Africa, Portuguese privateers were found to act in such diverse locations as the Alboran Sea (lying between the South of the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic coast of Morocco) and the Strait of Gibraltar or in the Western Mediterranean Sea.
The conquest of Ceuta, in 1415, increased the Portuguese privateers’ operating power. Several raiding missions are known to have left from that Moroccan port after being entrusted to fleets under the control of the fortress captain, Pedro de Meneses, as well as of the Portuguese princes Peter and Henry, to whom the Crown had bestowed legal powers for that particular purpose. The raiding spirit eventually presided over the birth of the Discoveries, since the successive ship crews sent by Prince Henry, from 1422 onward, charged with the task of passing Cape Bojador invariably made up the geostrategic failure by attacking Muslim vessels. Even after Gil Eanes had beaten the fear of the Cape in 1434, the privateer mood would prevail for another fourteen years, until Prince Henry decided that peaceful trade with the populations on the Western coast of Africa should replace the attacks launched against the villages. A new impetus to restore privateering would occur after Prince Henry’s death. Between 1475 and 1479, the exploration of the Atlantic and of the African coastline would give birth to further successful privateer raids by the Portuguese, now targeting Castilian ships which were met defying the Portuguese exclusive access to the region of Guinea.
The Treaty of Alcáçovas-Toledo (1479-1480) would settle the conflict and strengthen Portuguese hegemony and monopolist interests in South Atlantic waters. The pursuit of the Discoveries during the reign of King John II (1481-1495) had the major result of proving the plan of reaching India via a maritime passage along African Southeastern waters workable. King Manuel I had the good fortune to put it into action via the expedition commanded by Vasco da Gama (1497-1499).
In such a context, a new stage in the King’s commissioned privateer actions began to take shape. In fact, Gama’s success was uncontested on what concerned geographical exploratory incursions and coming across the main Indian centre of pepper trade (Calicut). However, the tense relations with the local sovereign and Islamic traders cast a shadow upon future bilateral relations. This scenario was aggravated by the fact that the main commercial routes of the Indian Ocean were under Islamic control and, therefore, highly adverse to Portuguese aspirations. That’s why Pedro Álvares Cabral, Admiral of the second Fleet sent by King Manuel I to India, in 1500, was instructed to intercept all Muslim sails.
By the end of his stay on the Indian subcontinent it had become evident that all Portuguese settlement efforts in the region would meet with warlike activities. King Manuel accepted the material and political costs of keeping and expanding the Portuguese presence in maritime Asia. As what was at stake was, in the long run, the commercial monopoly of Eastern spice trade, it was imperious to devise a strategy of maritime control. Vasco da Gama was charged with this duty, which led to the establishment of a Portuguese fleet operating on permanent terms in the West Indian Ocean, and originated a shipping pass system commonly known as cartaz (pl. cartazes), whereby licenses (letters of marque and reprisal) were granted to Portuguese allies; all the others would automatically become easy targets for Portuguese attack and arrest, due to the unmatched expertise in shipbuilding techniques and naval war tactics displayed by Portugal at the time.
A privateer “industry” was thus born in Asian waters. Particularly active in the first half of the 16th century, it played an important role in the formation and organization of Portuguese India, contributing to financial gains and, more importantly, to military and political achievements. The Crown assigned priority to attacks located on the maritime routes of the West Indian Ocean; on the Indian coastal waters of Malabar, from which most of the pepper trade was exported; on the waters surrounding the Maldives, where an alternative pepper route was developed from the island of Sumatra; on the routes leading to the Red Sea, to where converged ships sailing from the previous locations; and on the coast of Gujarat, where Muslim vessels from the Red Sea could be sighted. In the areas east of Cape Comorin and Ceylon island, Portugal adopted a more sensible approach, either for lack of means, due to a less expressive Muslim presence, or because it became evident that aggressive action would be incompatible with fruitful commercial relations.
Though privateer action served mainly political and strategic purposes, it nevertheless provided material gains and, therefore, encouraged the misuse of power. In spite of this, the Crown reserved for itself no more than 1/5 of the capture, the rest of the cargo being distributed among the officers and the crew members, according to rank. Several methods were implemented in order to spot and to prevent frauds: the existence of professionals exclusively tasked with supervising the confiscated cargo and its destination (military men, clerks and cargo administrators), the registry of all confiscated products in books kept for that purpose on board of the ships; the conduction of inquiries made to crew members after the ships arrived at Portuguese India. The problems, however, reached beyond the known cases of misappropriation of funds and goods, and went further than unlawful conduct by subaltern staff. Some of the King’s commanders, lured by the prospect of easy wealth, attacked vessels carrying letters of marquee, or blatantly disrespected the mission that they had been trusted with, engaging in maritime capture, and therefore displaying the existence of a deep chasm between private and governmental interests.
Bibliography:
PELÚCIA, Alexandra, Corsários e Piratas Portugueses. Aventureiros nos Mares da Ásia, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros, 2010. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe F. R., «Do Cabo Espichel a Macau: Vicissitudes do Corso Português», in As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. Actas do VI Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa (Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de 1991), eds. Artur Teodoro de Matos e Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, Macau-Lisboa, s.n., 1993, pp. 537-568.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva