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2009
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The Convention of Goa was signed on January 20, 1635, by the Portuguese viceroy, Dom Miguel de Noronha, 4th count of Linhares (1629-35) and the East India Company (EIC), whose president at the time was William Methwold. This accord ended a conflict in Asia between Portugal and Britain, which had begun in the 1580s because of the union between the Portuguese and the Spanish Crowns. As had happened in the peace agreement signed by England and Spain in 1630, this Convention celebrated the truce between the two kingdoms. The British were given the right to take harbor and trade in Portuguese ports in Asia. Along with having one less enemy in Asia, the Portuguese were also guaranteed British assistance in confronting Holland and its Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), the principal adversary of the Indian State.
During the first third of the 17th century, the activity of this company, which was founded in 1602, had greatly perturbed the presence of Portugal in Southeast Asia and Coromandel, where the Dutch came to control the spice and cotton trade in Indian territory. As a result, India came to have a serious competitor and powerful enemy, trying repeatedly to curtail Portuguese efforts by attacking Macao and its commerce, expulsing the Portuguese from Ugulim (Ben gala) and reducing Portuguese influence in the region of Coromandel.
At the same time, the British were present, especially in the regions of Guzerate and the Persian Gulf. Despite the attacks of the Portuguese, the British installed a commercial establishment in Surrate in 1618 and then proceeded to the north of India and to Arabic ports on the Red Sea. They helped local authorities there and recovered some Portuguese possessions. Of these, the most emblematic recovery was Ormuz in 1622, since it was a huge loss for the State of India.
In addition, the British and Dutch would join forces against India. The Treaty of Defence of 1619 stipulated the joint creation of an armada to capture the ships of the Indian Line, although it would also blockade Goa and Mozambique from 1621-23, attack Bombay in 1626 and extend its activity to Persia between1625-29. Portuguese interests in Asia during the first three decades of the 1600s would suffer important losses, as its possessions were put under general pressure and India continued to recoil.
In spite of this situation, the idea of a Portuguese-British accord in that part of the world was proposed by the latter. Indeed, despite its presence in important areas of Asian commerce, the East India Company (EIC) had limited military and commercial power; as such, its vessels navigated within the Dutch armadas. Due to this, Britain saw an accord with Portugal as the only way to make their presence in that area viable, as the Portuguese controlled strategic regions in Asia.
These were the main reasons that led the British president of the EIC, Joseph Hopkinson, to propose a truce and an alliance between his Company and India. This policy would be upheld by his successor, William Methwold, who communicated the proposal to two Portuguese Jesuits. Through this union, the Portuguese and British would be more powerful than the Dutch or Muslums and would come to be masters of India.
Contrary to the position of the Counsel of Portugal in Madrid, the viceroy count of Linhares thought that it would be advantageous to have a local accord with the British, since it would allow for a greater focus on the VOC, India's main opponent. He was convinced, furthermore, that the presence of British merchants in Portuguese ports in Asia would not greatly hamper Portuguese interests, and might even be beneficial and profitable because of the customs taxes that the men of the EIC would be obliged to pay.
The accord would be signed in 1635, but would be commercially very prejudicial for the State of India. As a result, it was greatly criticized by the new viceroy, Pedro da Silva (1635-39), who openly disapproved of the British presence in his ports, even though it meant that the Portuguese had only one adversary in Asia. In early 1936, therefore, he informed the president and counsel of the EIC in Surrate that, from then on, the members of the Company were prohibited from doing commerce in Portuguese ports and only had the right to harbor and provisions. King João IV also tried to restrict the British, in an amicable way, by ordering that they should be denied access to the pepper trade ports. Also, ships were not to be sent to Macao (a situation that would be reversed after the treaty of 1654).
Under the terms of the Convention, however, the British would remain in the ports of India. In fact, the EIC penetrated into various markets that were controlled by the Portuguese, who lost exclusive rights to the pepper trade of Malabar and Canará, where the British built a factory. They would also contraband gold in Mozambique and branch out to the Persian Gulf, to the market at Baçorá. This would be very prejudicial to Portuguese interests in the region, which would be limited to a factory in Kung. Unable to dominate the Dutch, the British concentrated on trading in markets controlled by the Portuguese, but did not pay customs taxes, which was prejudicial to the Indian Royal Treasury.
British access to the Chinese market would be one of the gravest consequences for India. Given the Dutch blockade of the Portuguese armadas in Malaca, in order to have access to merchandise in that region, in 1635 the viceroy was forced to allow the hiring of British vessels destined for Macao. Although prejudicial to India, the hiring (of vessels of both the EIC and the Courteen's Association, a private commercial association) would continue for the next several years. In return, the British guaranteed extensive commercial privileges to China and were given access to the silk, China wood, porcelain and gold market, for they wanted to do commerce in Macao (where they wanted to establish a factory) and to reestablish themselves in Japan (after an ephemeral experience with a factory in Hirado).
Despite these negative repercussions in Asian commerce, through the Convention of Goa, India would have one less adversary and would concentrate on combating the Dutch. Through this process of adapting to the balance of power in the Asian market, the British provided the Portuguese with important non-military support, by transporting Portuguese merchandise in their vessels which they protected from Dutch attacks. This would allow the Portuguese to continue doing commerce in some Asian markets where they had lost control.
Even though it ended some fifty years of conflict between two old allies, the accord of 1635 did not weaken Dutch dominance in the region, which would continue and expand. At the same time, Holland continued its offensive action against Portuguese interests. This would end momentarily in 1644, with an accord between Batávia (VOC headquarters in Asia) and Goa.
Bibliography:
BASSET, D.K., "Early English Trade and Settlement in Asia, 1602-1690", in Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia, 1968, pp. 83-109. BLANCO, Maria Manuel Sobral, O Estado Português da Índia: da rendição de Ormuz à perda de Cochim (1622-1663), Lisboa, 1992. PUGA, Rogério, "A Convenção de Goa" (1635) e a primeira viagem (luso) - inglesa a Macau", Revista de Estudos Anglo-Portugueses, nº14, 2005, pp. 71-108. SCAMMELL, G.V., The World Encompassed: the first european maritime enterprises, c.800-1650, Londres, Methuen, 1987. SUBRAHMANYAM, Sanjay, O Império Asiático Português, 1500-1700: uma história política e económica, Lisboa, Difel, 1995.
Translated by: Rosa Simas
During the first third of the 17th century, the activity of this company, which was founded in 1602, had greatly perturbed the presence of Portugal in Southeast Asia and Coromandel, where the Dutch came to control the spice and cotton trade in Indian territory. As a result, India came to have a serious competitor and powerful enemy, trying repeatedly to curtail Portuguese efforts by attacking Macao and its commerce, expulsing the Portuguese from Ugulim (Ben gala) and reducing Portuguese influence in the region of Coromandel.
At the same time, the British were present, especially in the regions of Guzerate and the Persian Gulf. Despite the attacks of the Portuguese, the British installed a commercial establishment in Surrate in 1618 and then proceeded to the north of India and to Arabic ports on the Red Sea. They helped local authorities there and recovered some Portuguese possessions. Of these, the most emblematic recovery was Ormuz in 1622, since it was a huge loss for the State of India.
In addition, the British and Dutch would join forces against India. The Treaty of Defence of 1619 stipulated the joint creation of an armada to capture the ships of the Indian Line, although it would also blockade Goa and Mozambique from 1621-23, attack Bombay in 1626 and extend its activity to Persia between1625-29. Portuguese interests in Asia during the first three decades of the 1600s would suffer important losses, as its possessions were put under general pressure and India continued to recoil.
In spite of this situation, the idea of a Portuguese-British accord in that part of the world was proposed by the latter. Indeed, despite its presence in important areas of Asian commerce, the East India Company (EIC) had limited military and commercial power; as such, its vessels navigated within the Dutch armadas. Due to this, Britain saw an accord with Portugal as the only way to make their presence in that area viable, as the Portuguese controlled strategic regions in Asia.
These were the main reasons that led the British president of the EIC, Joseph Hopkinson, to propose a truce and an alliance between his Company and India. This policy would be upheld by his successor, William Methwold, who communicated the proposal to two Portuguese Jesuits. Through this union, the Portuguese and British would be more powerful than the Dutch or Muslums and would come to be masters of India.
Contrary to the position of the Counsel of Portugal in Madrid, the viceroy count of Linhares thought that it would be advantageous to have a local accord with the British, since it would allow for a greater focus on the VOC, India's main opponent. He was convinced, furthermore, that the presence of British merchants in Portuguese ports in Asia would not greatly hamper Portuguese interests, and might even be beneficial and profitable because of the customs taxes that the men of the EIC would be obliged to pay.
The accord would be signed in 1635, but would be commercially very prejudicial for the State of India. As a result, it was greatly criticized by the new viceroy, Pedro da Silva (1635-39), who openly disapproved of the British presence in his ports, even though it meant that the Portuguese had only one adversary in Asia. In early 1936, therefore, he informed the president and counsel of the EIC in Surrate that, from then on, the members of the Company were prohibited from doing commerce in Portuguese ports and only had the right to harbor and provisions. King João IV also tried to restrict the British, in an amicable way, by ordering that they should be denied access to the pepper trade ports. Also, ships were not to be sent to Macao (a situation that would be reversed after the treaty of 1654).
Under the terms of the Convention, however, the British would remain in the ports of India. In fact, the EIC penetrated into various markets that were controlled by the Portuguese, who lost exclusive rights to the pepper trade of Malabar and Canará, where the British built a factory. They would also contraband gold in Mozambique and branch out to the Persian Gulf, to the market at Baçorá. This would be very prejudicial to Portuguese interests in the region, which would be limited to a factory in Kung. Unable to dominate the Dutch, the British concentrated on trading in markets controlled by the Portuguese, but did not pay customs taxes, which was prejudicial to the Indian Royal Treasury.
British access to the Chinese market would be one of the gravest consequences for India. Given the Dutch blockade of the Portuguese armadas in Malaca, in order to have access to merchandise in that region, in 1635 the viceroy was forced to allow the hiring of British vessels destined for Macao. Although prejudicial to India, the hiring (of vessels of both the EIC and the Courteen's Association, a private commercial association) would continue for the next several years. In return, the British guaranteed extensive commercial privileges to China and were given access to the silk, China wood, porcelain and gold market, for they wanted to do commerce in Macao (where they wanted to establish a factory) and to reestablish themselves in Japan (after an ephemeral experience with a factory in Hirado).
Despite these negative repercussions in Asian commerce, through the Convention of Goa, India would have one less adversary and would concentrate on combating the Dutch. Through this process of adapting to the balance of power in the Asian market, the British provided the Portuguese with important non-military support, by transporting Portuguese merchandise in their vessels which they protected from Dutch attacks. This would allow the Portuguese to continue doing commerce in some Asian markets where they had lost control.
Even though it ended some fifty years of conflict between two old allies, the accord of 1635 did not weaken Dutch dominance in the region, which would continue and expand. At the same time, Holland continued its offensive action against Portuguese interests. This would end momentarily in 1644, with an accord between Batávia (VOC headquarters in Asia) and Goa.
Bibliography:
BASSET, D.K., "Early English Trade and Settlement in Asia, 1602-1690", in Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia, 1968, pp. 83-109. BLANCO, Maria Manuel Sobral, O Estado Português da Índia: da rendição de Ormuz à perda de Cochim (1622-1663), Lisboa, 1992. PUGA, Rogério, "A Convenção de Goa" (1635) e a primeira viagem (luso) - inglesa a Macau", Revista de Estudos Anglo-Portugueses, nº14, 2005, pp. 71-108. SCAMMELL, G.V., The World Encompassed: the first european maritime enterprises, c.800-1650, Londres, Methuen, 1987. SUBRAHMANYAM, Sanjay, O Império Asiático Português, 1500-1700: uma história política e económica, Lisboa, Difel, 1995.
Translated by: Rosa Simas