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2009
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The Portuguese Restoration in 1640 ended six decades of foreign reign, and placed a new ruling dynasty in the kingdom of Portugal. The new government's foreign policy favoured diplomatic alliances with the main European powers as a means of both legitimising its independent sovereignty and gathering allies for the predictably long confrontation with the Spanish monarchy. The Portuguese strategy was therefore set in order to take advantage of the balance policy that characterised the European Crowns, and that was so typical of the sixteen hundreds within the context of the antagonisms produced around the Atlantic region. This course of action was however a rather difficult one to implement. Several factors contributed to it: Portuguese foreign policy opposed the Protestant outlook; the French had been attacking Brazilian territory even before the Iberian union was created, and therefore were not moved by any particular kind of opposition to the Spanish kings; the Dutch persisted in fighting Portuguese interests all over the world, in spite of some common European goals; the old British ally had withdrawn from the European scene in order to settle turbulence at home; Portuguese foreign policy was mainly influenced by the Pope's authority and the Pope was contrary to the 1640 revolt charging it of weakening the power of Catholicism; the unsettled outcome of the Thirty Years War provided no assurance of successfully lining up with the victorious party.
The initial support of the French Crown to the restoration movement, made evident through the 1641 treaty, is explained within the background of the conflict France fought against the Spanish monarchy in order to dictate hegemony in Europe, a fight that marked the European political scenario in the 17th century. Rebellions like those that took place in Portugal and Catalonia were therefore beneficial to the French Crown, as they implied Spanish involvement in several war fronts and the corresponding decrease of the latter's strength on other military settings.
A closer relationship with the United Provinces was likewise possible, since they were also at war with the Hispanic monarchy. However, the same reasons that brought these crowns together with regard to European matters set them apart on the subject of overseas interests. Permanent antagonism and countless rivalries prevented the several powers to develop a basis of reciprocal understanding, even though a peace agreement was signed in 1641, in The Hague, granting the Dutch privileges in Portuguese overseas territories. In fact, Portugal had to face during the whole 17th century the strong competition of the British and the Dutch; the latter, in particular, acted relentlessly with a view to occupy some areas of overseas Portuguese territory (such as Brazil and Angola), to conquer several places in Estado da India (being successful on some of their attempts, namely in Malacca), and to threaten Portuguese sovereignty in other parts of the world.
Portugal called upon the United Kingdom for help. A great power and a Portuguese ally for a long time now, the British support was highly regarded, and was internally considered a crucial one for the fulfilment of the new dynasty's pretensions. In spite of this, the first envoy sent to London only managed to gain the British acknowledgement of the political change that had occurred in Portugal, which was hardly identical to approving the Restoration. In other words, the two monarchs settled for an unclear and ambiguous commitment so that no harm befell the diplomatic obligations of the British towards the Spanish monarchy. The Portuguese Crown obtained the support that was possible at the time, and the United Kingdom avoided a full commitment with the new dynasty.
Portugal also sought the approval of the Holy See in order to complete the process of legitimising the Restoration. However, the popery persisted in an unyielding endorsement of the Hispanic stance, as Spain represented, within the political and religious map of the time, the last hope of re-enacting European Catholic unity. In addition to this, Spain enjoyed a growing influence over the Pope himself, which barred the admittance of the first Portuguese committee within the Pope's quarters. The envoys returned to Portugal without having been received by the Pope.
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of directions and contacts embodying Portuguese diplomacy, the French monarchy was always regarded along the 1640s and the 1650s as the main support and foundation of Portuguese foreign policy. Several attempts followed aiming at the celebration of a formal league and Portuguese-French union, but none succeeded, because France repeatedly acted in order to prevent that the Portuguese Crown barred a prospective peace settlement with Spain. To reach an understanding with Spain was undoubtedly a priority of Parisian foreign policy and Portugal's need of support was used for the benefit of France's aims in this matter. The ambiguous and volatile conduct of the French reinforced the diplomatic importance of the United Kingdom which became the main resource of Portuguese foreign policy from mid 1650s onwards.
The British went through a period of intense commotion at home, especially during the 1640s when the civil war between the King's supporters and the Parliament's forces caused riots and social unrest leading to the overthrow of the monarchy and to the proclamation of the parliamentary government. These circumstances caused the suspension of diplomatic ties with Portugal which would be resumed by the time the Westminster Treaty was signed, in 1654. According to this treaty, celebration of the peace settlement included granting ample privileges and commercial rights to the British, in the Kingdom as well as in the Portuguese Empire, and this marked the beginning of the British ascendance over Portugal.
This Treaty was however an insufficient basis of support, and the Portuguese Crown remained vulnerable, since the agreement didn´t assure military aid from the ally against the Hispanic monarchy or the United Provinces. Antagonist conduct towards the Portuguese persisted, and even increased after the peace settlement of 1648 was celebrated in The Hague between the Dutch and the Spanish, since it granted to the Dutch the right to remain in the occupied overseas territories, a clause that not only continued the conflict with Portugal as extended it to the metropolis by the end of the 1650s.
In 1659, the Pyrenees Treaty brought a final and successful close to that which the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 had failed to accomplish, i. e. the peace between France and Spain, ending a conflict started in 1635. Under the pressure of an understanding between France and Britain, the Hispanic monarchy finally made peace with its rival, after more than three decades of war, leaving the Portuguese Crown in a very delicate situation. In fact, the 1659 Treaty meant a greater military ease for Spain (given the cessation of warfare on several European sites) and the end of diplomatic relations between France and Portugal. In addition to this, hostilities with the United Provinces continued, further into Asia, leading to the definite conquest of Ceylon in 1658 and to the almost complete withdrawal from the Coromandel coast. Only the United Kingdom remained an anchor for Portuguese foreign policy, for the advantage of both parties: the Portuguese protected their sovereignty, and the British obtained economic and political privileges in return for their support. The much longed for military and diplomatic aid finally came from the United Kingdom, shortly after the Restoration of the monarchy, in the 1661 treaty that celebrated the alliance of the two monarchies and the union of the two Houses through the marriage of Charles II and Catarina of Braganza.
Portugal could finally count on a solid and effective support in Europe, and that would prove decisive for solving the Iberian conflict, at last brought to an end by 1668, under British mediation, after twenty-eight years of struggle. Also in 1661 an understanding with the United Provinces was accomplished, bringing back to Portuguese control Brazilian and Angolan territories in exchange of the concession of significant commercial privileges. The agreement secured the Portuguese overseas possessions at the same time that ended the successive attacks launched by the Dutch against Portuguese trading posts. In spite of it, the United Provinces kept their hostilities in Asia during the time that spanned from the Treaty's celebration and its official publication in the East, and in the meanwhile managed to conquer Portuguese possessions in Malabar (Kollam, Cannanore, Cranganor, and Kochi). These events placed the two countries on unfriendly terms until 1669, when the treaty of The Hague was celebrated.
The following year improvements regarding the relation with the Holy See were noticeable, helped by the agreement between Portugal and Spain. The Portuguese envoy, the Count of Prado, was received on 19 July 1670 by Pope Clement IX, who finally recognised the dynasty of Braganza.
Bibliography:
MACEDO, Jorge Borges de, História Diplomática Portuguesa: constantes e linhas de força. MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, História diplomática de Portugal. PRESTAGE, Edgar, As Relações Diplomáticas de Portugal com a França, Inglaterra e Holanda de 1640 a 1668, Coimbra, Impr. da Universidade, 1928.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva
A closer relationship with the United Provinces was likewise possible, since they were also at war with the Hispanic monarchy. However, the same reasons that brought these crowns together with regard to European matters set them apart on the subject of overseas interests. Permanent antagonism and countless rivalries prevented the several powers to develop a basis of reciprocal understanding, even though a peace agreement was signed in 1641, in The Hague, granting the Dutch privileges in Portuguese overseas territories. In fact, Portugal had to face during the whole 17th century the strong competition of the British and the Dutch; the latter, in particular, acted relentlessly with a view to occupy some areas of overseas Portuguese territory (such as Brazil and Angola), to conquer several places in Estado da India (being successful on some of their attempts, namely in Malacca), and to threaten Portuguese sovereignty in other parts of the world.
Portugal called upon the United Kingdom for help. A great power and a Portuguese ally for a long time now, the British support was highly regarded, and was internally considered a crucial one for the fulfilment of the new dynasty's pretensions. In spite of this, the first envoy sent to London only managed to gain the British acknowledgement of the political change that had occurred in Portugal, which was hardly identical to approving the Restoration. In other words, the two monarchs settled for an unclear and ambiguous commitment so that no harm befell the diplomatic obligations of the British towards the Spanish monarchy. The Portuguese Crown obtained the support that was possible at the time, and the United Kingdom avoided a full commitment with the new dynasty.
Portugal also sought the approval of the Holy See in order to complete the process of legitimising the Restoration. However, the popery persisted in an unyielding endorsement of the Hispanic stance, as Spain represented, within the political and religious map of the time, the last hope of re-enacting European Catholic unity. In addition to this, Spain enjoyed a growing influence over the Pope himself, which barred the admittance of the first Portuguese committee within the Pope's quarters. The envoys returned to Portugal without having been received by the Pope.
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of directions and contacts embodying Portuguese diplomacy, the French monarchy was always regarded along the 1640s and the 1650s as the main support and foundation of Portuguese foreign policy. Several attempts followed aiming at the celebration of a formal league and Portuguese-French union, but none succeeded, because France repeatedly acted in order to prevent that the Portuguese Crown barred a prospective peace settlement with Spain. To reach an understanding with Spain was undoubtedly a priority of Parisian foreign policy and Portugal's need of support was used for the benefit of France's aims in this matter. The ambiguous and volatile conduct of the French reinforced the diplomatic importance of the United Kingdom which became the main resource of Portuguese foreign policy from mid 1650s onwards.
The British went through a period of intense commotion at home, especially during the 1640s when the civil war between the King's supporters and the Parliament's forces caused riots and social unrest leading to the overthrow of the monarchy and to the proclamation of the parliamentary government. These circumstances caused the suspension of diplomatic ties with Portugal which would be resumed by the time the Westminster Treaty was signed, in 1654. According to this treaty, celebration of the peace settlement included granting ample privileges and commercial rights to the British, in the Kingdom as well as in the Portuguese Empire, and this marked the beginning of the British ascendance over Portugal.
This Treaty was however an insufficient basis of support, and the Portuguese Crown remained vulnerable, since the agreement didn´t assure military aid from the ally against the Hispanic monarchy or the United Provinces. Antagonist conduct towards the Portuguese persisted, and even increased after the peace settlement of 1648 was celebrated in The Hague between the Dutch and the Spanish, since it granted to the Dutch the right to remain in the occupied overseas territories, a clause that not only continued the conflict with Portugal as extended it to the metropolis by the end of the 1650s.
In 1659, the Pyrenees Treaty brought a final and successful close to that which the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 had failed to accomplish, i. e. the peace between France and Spain, ending a conflict started in 1635. Under the pressure of an understanding between France and Britain, the Hispanic monarchy finally made peace with its rival, after more than three decades of war, leaving the Portuguese Crown in a very delicate situation. In fact, the 1659 Treaty meant a greater military ease for Spain (given the cessation of warfare on several European sites) and the end of diplomatic relations between France and Portugal. In addition to this, hostilities with the United Provinces continued, further into Asia, leading to the definite conquest of Ceylon in 1658 and to the almost complete withdrawal from the Coromandel coast. Only the United Kingdom remained an anchor for Portuguese foreign policy, for the advantage of both parties: the Portuguese protected their sovereignty, and the British obtained economic and political privileges in return for their support. The much longed for military and diplomatic aid finally came from the United Kingdom, shortly after the Restoration of the monarchy, in the 1661 treaty that celebrated the alliance of the two monarchies and the union of the two Houses through the marriage of Charles II and Catarina of Braganza.
Portugal could finally count on a solid and effective support in Europe, and that would prove decisive for solving the Iberian conflict, at last brought to an end by 1668, under British mediation, after twenty-eight years of struggle. Also in 1661 an understanding with the United Provinces was accomplished, bringing back to Portuguese control Brazilian and Angolan territories in exchange of the concession of significant commercial privileges. The agreement secured the Portuguese overseas possessions at the same time that ended the successive attacks launched by the Dutch against Portuguese trading posts. In spite of it, the United Provinces kept their hostilities in Asia during the time that spanned from the Treaty's celebration and its official publication in the East, and in the meanwhile managed to conquer Portuguese possessions in Malabar (Kollam, Cannanore, Cranganor, and Kochi). These events placed the two countries on unfriendly terms until 1669, when the treaty of The Hague was celebrated.
The following year improvements regarding the relation with the Holy See were noticeable, helped by the agreement between Portugal and Spain. The Portuguese envoy, the Count of Prado, was received on 19 July 1670 by Pope Clement IX, who finally recognised the dynasty of Braganza.
Bibliography:
MACEDO, Jorge Borges de, História Diplomática Portuguesa: constantes e linhas de força. MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, História diplomática de Portugal. PRESTAGE, Edgar, As Relações Diplomáticas de Portugal com a França, Inglaterra e Holanda de 1640 a 1668, Coimbra, Impr. da Universidade, 1928.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva