The Treaty of Westminster was signed in 1654 by Portugal and the United Kingdom. This treaty must be understood within the context of Portuguese diplomacy during the period of the restoration, when the kingdom of Portugal was almost completely isolated from Europe. In fact, misunderstandings with the United Dutch Provinces persisted, as did the reluctance of the Holy See to recognize the new dynasty and the diplomatic inconsistencies of France (as would be later confirmed by the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, which celebrated peace between the Spanish and French Crowns). In addition, Portugal feared that the Brazilian fleet might be seized by the British, who established their importance in balancing European affairs with the Treaty of Westphalia, signed on October 24, 1648. This was the beginning of rivalry in the Atlantic between the United Kingdom, the United Provinces and, in a certain way, France. At the same time, after the end of the civil war and the unification of Scotland, the British monarchy was also enjoying a more favorable domestic situation and had adopted a more far-reaching policy in the North Sea based on its naval power, under the command of Admiral Blake (1649-57). As a result, confrontation broke out with the United Provinces (which were at peace with the Spanish monarchy after the Treaty of The Hague of 1648). This would confirm the supremacy of the British naval force, as did the Treaty of Westminster of April 5, 1654. Simultaneously, there was an approximation to France, at the time of Mazarino, and to Portugal. Given its strategic maritime importance, Portugal tried to take advantage of the growing rivalry in the Atlantic by basing its foreign policy on the supremacy of the British.
Bilateral relations between the two Crowns had become subdued, given the civil war in England, which opposed the king to parliamentarians. Portugal supported the royal cause, through its resident minister, António de Sousa de Macedo. The defeat of the king weakened the position of the Portuguese, which would be further debilitated by the struggle between the Polish princes, Rupert and Maurice, nephews of Charles I. These princes, along with part of the royal armada, would not submit to the British parliamentary Republic. Between 1649 and 1950, they installed themselves at the mouth of the Tagus River and realized various attacks on parliamentary vessels. By refusing to accept the fleet of the princes and the ships seized, the Portuguese Crown contributed to the emergence of grave tensions with the new British leadership. These would lead the British armada (commanded by Admiral Blake) to enter the Tagus, block the port of Lisbon and seized innumerable vessels of the Brazilian fleet, in a direct confrontation between the Portuguese and British armadas. Given their difficulties with the blockade, the English would leave in October of 1650. This would allow for the departure of the Polish princes, whose fleet would later be captured in Carthage, although they themselves managed to escape.
After these incidents, the Portuguese government quickly tried to move closer to its former ally. As early as December 27, 1650, therefore, Dr. João de Guimarães was sent to London to draw up a truce with the parliamentary Republic of the United Kingdom and to resume commercial ties with England, for Portugal was afraid of a possible accord between the British crown and the Spanish Monarchy (which had already recognized the British parliament). The British would, nevertheless, make certain demands, all related to the previous confrontation that had occurred on the Tagus. Faced with the intransigence of the British, the Portuguese envoy would return to Portugal in May of that year.
Portugal made another attempt to reach an understanding in September of 1652, when it dispatched a mission headed by João Rodrigues de Sá e Menezes, count of Penaguião, with specific instructions to overcome the impasse between the two countries. This resolution would depend upon Portugal's acceptance of the conditions set by the British Parliament. Therefore, on December 29 of that year, an accord between the two countries was outlined, with six preliminary articles which had been first outlined by the previous Portuguese mission. These included the liberation of the British prisoners; the restitution of the ships and goods apprehended, with respective compensation; the punishment of those that were responsible for the death of British subjects on Portuguese territory; and the payment of 50 thousand pounds, along with 114,246 more pounds to pay for the seizures made by the British.
Along with these, the British would make more demands, given the greater need that the Portuguese felt to reach an agreement. Influenced by merchants, therefore, the envoys of the British crown would impose thirty-eight extra conditions and nine additional articles; the Portuguese ambassador accepted practically all of these. The Portuguese monarch's extreme reluctant to sign the agreement was one of the reasons it would take more than one year to be concluded. Although the treaty would later be signed, the brother of the count of Penaguião (member of the Portuguese mission to London), would be condemned and executed in July of 1654 because of a row that resulted in the death of a British official.
The treaty of Westminster was finally signed on July 10, 1654. Portugal would make ample concessions to see its independence recognized (article 1), a matter of extreme importance to the kingdom. Even though common privileges were stipulated, such as free trade in all domains (2nd) and the free transit of ships between both ports (18th), the treaty focuses especially on the rights and privileges granted to British subjects. These include religious freedom in Portuguese territory (14th); judicial, fiscal and economic rights for British citizens residing in Portugal (5th, 8th, 9th and 13th); and the reinstatement of ships, goods and money taken by Portuguese landlords 25th). In addition, the treaty calls for freedom of commerce in all Portuguese territory (3rd), with various privileges and tax exemptions (20th and a secret article), as well as the authorization for British and Castilian relations (10th). Commerce with Brazil was of particular importance, as British merchants were given freedom to participate in the commercial transactions between Brazil and Portugal, except with respect to five products (flour, fish, wine, olive oil and Brazil wood), which remained under the control of the Company of Brazil (11th).
Despite the vulnerability of Portugal with respect to Great Britain, King João IV decided not to ratify the treaty, in opposition to the religious freedom granted and the excessive economic demands of the accord. During the next two years, the Portuguese crown would try to modify some aspects of the treaty. On June 9, 1656, however, the Portuguese monarch would end up ratifying the treaty, without alterations, due to the pressure made on Lisbon by Admiral Blade and by the count of Sandwich, Edward Montagu, who also called for the payment of 50 thousand pounds. The British would ratify the treaty on February 9, 1657.
The Treaty of Westminster is normally seen as the beginning of British political supremacy over Portugal. In order to guarantee its independence, the kingdom of Portugal utilized its mercantile potential and strategic importance to join forces with the United Kingdom of the time of Cromwell (as Lord Protector, the head of the British parliamentary Republic from 1653-58). In exchange, the Portuguese crown had to make ample economic and commercial concessions, both in Portugal and in its overseas territories, thereby satisfying the economic (safety in Atlantic routes), political (isolation from France), and strategic (utilization of Portuguese ports) aspirations of the United Kingdom. Proof of this are the ample rights and privileges that British subjects acquired (rights and privileges which the British government had proposed to the Spanish Crown, but which had been denied), giving British subjects in Portugal similar status to that of Portuguese subjects.
From that moment on, the United Kingdom would become the main alternative to France, considered from the beginning to be Portugal's main ally in its struggle for independence. This strategic orientation, however, would end with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. After this, the United Kingdom would become the main player in Portuguese foreign policy.
Bibliography:
BRAZÃO, Eduardo, A Diplomacia Portuguesa nos Séculos XVII e XVIII, vol. I, Lisboa, Resistência, 1979-1980. Collecção de Tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da Índia fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Ásia e Africa Oriental desde o princípio da conquista até ao fim do século XVIII, ed. Júlio Firmino Judice Biker, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, Tomo II, 1882, pp. 188-231. MACEDO, Jorge Borges de, História Diplomática Portuguesa: constantes e linhas de força, Lisboa, Revista Nação e Defesa, 1987. MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, História diplomática de Portugal, Lisboa, Verbo, 1986. PRESTAGE, Edgar, As Relações Diplomáticas de Portugal com a França, Inglaterra e Holanda de 1640 a 1668, Coimbra, Impr. da Universidade, 1928. "The Treaties of 1642, 1654 and 1661", in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, Watford, Voss and Michael, 1935, pp. 130-151.
Translated by: Rosa Simas.
