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2009
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The conquest of Ceuta, a Moroccan city which was taken in 1415 by an expedition under the command of King Dom João I himself, is generally considered to be a founding moment in the Portuguese overseas expansion. Due to its primordial significance, the conquest of Ceuta has for centuries been the subject of intense debate in Portuguese historiography. Both the reasons that motivated the desire to conquer a territory outside the Iberian Peninsula and that led to the selection of Ceuta, are still debated nowadays; however, that it is possible to incorporate the conquest of Ceuta into a chronology of Christian incursions into North Africa during previous centuries has been established. As exemplified by the incursions of the Sicilian Normans in the 12th century or by the Castillian expedition against the Teutons in 1399, these attacks were nevertheless motivated by pillaging and eliminating the threats posed by piracy, as well as by temporary occupation of ports, rather than by permanent occupations as would occur in Ceuta.
For the Iberian Kingdoms, the legitimacy of these military incursions against the Muslims of North Africa reflected the multi-secular conflict of reconquering the Peninsula as well as the fact that the region had been the ancestral estate of the Visigothic Monarchy, of which the Christian Kings of the Peninsula considered themselves heirs. This situation explains why in the 1291 Sória Treaty Castille and Aragon divided among themselves the territory that each would conquer in Morocco.
In Portugal, the first traces of an interest in military attacks in North Africa emerged during the reign of Dom Afonso IV, to whom was granted a Bull of Crusade in 1341. The implementation of these projects, however, kept being delayed as the efforts of the Kingdom turned predominantly towards the conflicts with Castille.
This situation would only change in 1411, with the signing in Ayllón of a peace treaty between Portugal and Castille. The peace that was reached in Ayllón, nevertheless resulted in new challenges for the Portuguese Crown. On the one hand, the Avis Dinasty needed to find new ways to establish its legitimacy and secure its political position in Christendom. On the other hand, with the cessation of war, the nobility´s chances of achieving honors, mercês, and profits came to a standstill, especially for second-born sons, rendering them an uneasy social group. Thus it became necessary to establish new arenas for military intervention to replace the war with Castille.
In light of these circumstances, investment in crusade projects which were based on unending conflict with the Muslims became pressing and of special interest to the military nobility. These projects were focused particularly around two possibilities of conquest: the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada or the Marinid Kingdom of Fez, where Ceuta was located. The conquest of Granada was problematic, however, due to representing a clear intrusion into Castille´s territory of reconquest. On the other hand, the internal difficulties that the Marinids had been experiencing for the preceding decades would be advantageous to a Portuguese attack on Ceuta. The city also had the pontential of serving both as a bridgehead to an eventual conquest of the Kingdom of Fez, and as an outpost in a strategy of siege and isolation of the Kingdom of Granada.
The conquest of Ceuta had the added advantage of targeting a strategic location for domain of the Straight of Gibraltar by controlling the commercial routes connecting the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Though Ceuta was utilized as a port for Saharan commerce as well - which for the most part left the city after the Portuguese conquest - the main economic interest in conquering the city was its strategic position for defense of both the maritime routes that crossed the straight and fishing near the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Portuguese and foreign merchant groups viewed the conquest of the city as being advantageous, since it could also serve as a base of support to Christian merchants and of combat to Muslim pirating activities.
Finally, the riches to be obtained from pillaging a portuary city as wealthy as Ceuta after its conquest, seemed an appealing factor, to which was added reinforcing the diplomatic position of the Kingdom of Portugal with the Holy See in light of the whole Res Publica Christiana dynamic that would result from successful war against the infidels.
The project of conquest of Ceuta, therefore, was not merely a natural extension of the reconquest of Algarve, since it resulted from a combination of interests in Portuguese society, at the political, economical, social, and religious levels, having been developed by the inner circle of the Portuguese Crown over a period of years, with the support of the Princes, above all. The following years were a time for debate and preparation, as it was necessary to finance the expedition, assemble ships and provisions, and recruit military effectives.
The legitimization of the objective was achieved via a diplomatic mission sent to Sicily, which passed through Ceuta, evaluating its defenses. In the Kingdom, despite the preparations for a military expedition, its objective was kept secret until the final moments. In the summer of 1415, the fleet was ready to sail from Lisbon; however, its departure was delayed by Queen Dona Filipa´s death on July 19th. The expedition finally set sail on July 25th. The exact number of ships and men it comprised is unknown but everything indicates that the ships would have totaled a few dozens and the soldiers a few thousands.
The fleet headed to Algarve first, and on July 28th in Lagos, the objective of the enterprise was finally divulged. Due to the doldrums, the expedition only left Algarve in early August. Scattered by a storm, some ships sighted Ceuta on August 13th, before the fleet had regrouped in Algeciras. The Council met to determine the best strategy for attacking Ceuta, which, meanwhile, had been warned about the imminent attack and reinforced by neighboring military effectives.
The landing ocurred on August 21st, with the attack on Almina Beach, as the Muslim defenders were easily defeated. In light of the hasty retreat of the enemy forces, the vanguard of the Portuguese army, led by the Princes Dom Duarte and Dom Henrique, proceeded with its offensive, succeeding in penetrating Ceuta´s defenses, before it was reinforced by the main body of the expedition troops. After some hours of combat in the streets, the attackers had control of the city, and the castle was abandoned by its defenders, without resistance.
By the end of the day on August 21, 1415, Ceuta had been effectively conquered by the Portuguese forces. The following week, with King Dom João I present, the city witnessed the official consecration of the great Mosk as a church, and the solemn ritual of knighting the Princes and many of the nobles who had participated in the battle. The conquest, however, gave rise to a debate as to whether the city should be occupied permanently or abandoned after pillaging. The King´s will prevailed; he favored the first option, viewing the conquest of a city within Muslim territory as a means of consecrating the new dynasty, a fact that led him to call himself "Lord of Ceuta."
The administration of the citadel having been opted for, after being refused by personages such as Constable Nuno Álvares Pereira and Marshall Gonçalo Vasques Coutinho, its captaincy was turned over to Dom Pedro Meneses, Count of Viana, who commanded a garrison of 2,500 men.
The news of the conquest achieved by the King of Portugal spread rapidly, fulfilling in this sense its objective of increasing Portugal´s standing with both the Holy See and other Kingdoms of Christendom.
Bibliography: BRAGA, Isabel R. Mendes Drumond e Braga, Paulo Drumond, Ceuta Portuguesa, Ceuta, Instituto de Estúdios Ceutíes, 1998. COELHO, Maria Helena da Cruz, D. João I, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, 2005. COSTA, João Paulo, Henrique, o Infante, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros, 2009. FARINHA, António Dias, "Norte de África" in História da Expansão Portuguesa, vol. I, direcção de Francisco Bethen court e Kirti Chaudhuri, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, 1998, pp. 118-136. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe, "Expansão Portuguesa e Expansão Europeia - reflexões em torno da génese dos Descobrimentos" in De Ceuta a Timor, Lisboa, Difel, 1994, pp. 1-43. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe, "A evolução da política expansionista portuguesa na primeira metade de Quatrocentos" in De Ceuta a Timor, Lisboa, Difel, 1994, pp. 43-147.
Translated by: Maria João Pimentel
For the Iberian Kingdoms, the legitimacy of these military incursions against the Muslims of North Africa reflected the multi-secular conflict of reconquering the Peninsula as well as the fact that the region had been the ancestral estate of the Visigothic Monarchy, of which the Christian Kings of the Peninsula considered themselves heirs. This situation explains why in the 1291 Sória Treaty Castille and Aragon divided among themselves the territory that each would conquer in Morocco.
In Portugal, the first traces of an interest in military attacks in North Africa emerged during the reign of Dom Afonso IV, to whom was granted a Bull of Crusade in 1341. The implementation of these projects, however, kept being delayed as the efforts of the Kingdom turned predominantly towards the conflicts with Castille.
This situation would only change in 1411, with the signing in Ayllón of a peace treaty between Portugal and Castille. The peace that was reached in Ayllón, nevertheless resulted in new challenges for the Portuguese Crown. On the one hand, the Avis Dinasty needed to find new ways to establish its legitimacy and secure its political position in Christendom. On the other hand, with the cessation of war, the nobility´s chances of achieving honors, mercês, and profits came to a standstill, especially for second-born sons, rendering them an uneasy social group. Thus it became necessary to establish new arenas for military intervention to replace the war with Castille.
In light of these circumstances, investment in crusade projects which were based on unending conflict with the Muslims became pressing and of special interest to the military nobility. These projects were focused particularly around two possibilities of conquest: the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada or the Marinid Kingdom of Fez, where Ceuta was located. The conquest of Granada was problematic, however, due to representing a clear intrusion into Castille´s territory of reconquest. On the other hand, the internal difficulties that the Marinids had been experiencing for the preceding decades would be advantageous to a Portuguese attack on Ceuta. The city also had the pontential of serving both as a bridgehead to an eventual conquest of the Kingdom of Fez, and as an outpost in a strategy of siege and isolation of the Kingdom of Granada.
The conquest of Ceuta had the added advantage of targeting a strategic location for domain of the Straight of Gibraltar by controlling the commercial routes connecting the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Though Ceuta was utilized as a port for Saharan commerce as well - which for the most part left the city after the Portuguese conquest - the main economic interest in conquering the city was its strategic position for defense of both the maritime routes that crossed the straight and fishing near the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Portuguese and foreign merchant groups viewed the conquest of the city as being advantageous, since it could also serve as a base of support to Christian merchants and of combat to Muslim pirating activities.
Finally, the riches to be obtained from pillaging a portuary city as wealthy as Ceuta after its conquest, seemed an appealing factor, to which was added reinforcing the diplomatic position of the Kingdom of Portugal with the Holy See in light of the whole Res Publica Christiana dynamic that would result from successful war against the infidels.
The project of conquest of Ceuta, therefore, was not merely a natural extension of the reconquest of Algarve, since it resulted from a combination of interests in Portuguese society, at the political, economical, social, and religious levels, having been developed by the inner circle of the Portuguese Crown over a period of years, with the support of the Princes, above all. The following years were a time for debate and preparation, as it was necessary to finance the expedition, assemble ships and provisions, and recruit military effectives.
The legitimization of the objective was achieved via a diplomatic mission sent to Sicily, which passed through Ceuta, evaluating its defenses. In the Kingdom, despite the preparations for a military expedition, its objective was kept secret until the final moments. In the summer of 1415, the fleet was ready to sail from Lisbon; however, its departure was delayed by Queen Dona Filipa´s death on July 19th. The expedition finally set sail on July 25th. The exact number of ships and men it comprised is unknown but everything indicates that the ships would have totaled a few dozens and the soldiers a few thousands.
The fleet headed to Algarve first, and on July 28th in Lagos, the objective of the enterprise was finally divulged. Due to the doldrums, the expedition only left Algarve in early August. Scattered by a storm, some ships sighted Ceuta on August 13th, before the fleet had regrouped in Algeciras. The Council met to determine the best strategy for attacking Ceuta, which, meanwhile, had been warned about the imminent attack and reinforced by neighboring military effectives.
The landing ocurred on August 21st, with the attack on Almina Beach, as the Muslim defenders were easily defeated. In light of the hasty retreat of the enemy forces, the vanguard of the Portuguese army, led by the Princes Dom Duarte and Dom Henrique, proceeded with its offensive, succeeding in penetrating Ceuta´s defenses, before it was reinforced by the main body of the expedition troops. After some hours of combat in the streets, the attackers had control of the city, and the castle was abandoned by its defenders, without resistance.
By the end of the day on August 21, 1415, Ceuta had been effectively conquered by the Portuguese forces. The following week, with King Dom João I present, the city witnessed the official consecration of the great Mosk as a church, and the solemn ritual of knighting the Princes and many of the nobles who had participated in the battle. The conquest, however, gave rise to a debate as to whether the city should be occupied permanently or abandoned after pillaging. The King´s will prevailed; he favored the first option, viewing the conquest of a city within Muslim territory as a means of consecrating the new dynasty, a fact that led him to call himself "Lord of Ceuta."
The administration of the citadel having been opted for, after being refused by personages such as Constable Nuno Álvares Pereira and Marshall Gonçalo Vasques Coutinho, its captaincy was turned over to Dom Pedro Meneses, Count of Viana, who commanded a garrison of 2,500 men.
The news of the conquest achieved by the King of Portugal spread rapidly, fulfilling in this sense its objective of increasing Portugal´s standing with both the Holy See and other Kingdoms of Christendom.
Bibliography: BRAGA, Isabel R. Mendes Drumond e Braga, Paulo Drumond, Ceuta Portuguesa, Ceuta, Instituto de Estúdios Ceutíes, 1998. COELHO, Maria Helena da Cruz, D. João I, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, 2005. COSTA, João Paulo, Henrique, o Infante, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros, 2009. FARINHA, António Dias, "Norte de África" in História da Expansão Portuguesa, vol. I, direcção de Francisco Bethen court e Kirti Chaudhuri, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, 1998, pp. 118-136. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe, "Expansão Portuguesa e Expansão Europeia - reflexões em torno da génese dos Descobrimentos" in De Ceuta a Timor, Lisboa, Difel, 1994, pp. 1-43. THOMAZ, Luís Filipe, "A evolução da política expansionista portuguesa na primeira metade de Quatrocentos" in De Ceuta a Timor, Lisboa, Difel, 1994, pp. 43-147.
Translated by: Maria João Pimentel