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2009
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The 1661 Treaty must be set within the complex background of Portuguese Restoration diplomacy and in the specific context of Portugal's need and willingness to get closer to the British ally.
The first steps towards the agreement occurred during the period that Francisco de Melo de Torres spent in London as an ambassador of the Portuguese kingdom (1657-1661), especially the late part of that embassy. Given the fact that the restored British monarchy didn't ratify the treaty of 28 April 1660 (through which the then ruling Council of State had agreed to help Portugal with armament and soldiers), the Portuguese ambassador tried to make out London's interest on marrying Charles II to infanta Dona Catarina. All negotiations and activities leading to the nuptial arrangement were set in motion with the utmost discretion. The Count of Soure, who was the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, suggested that Portugal should address to the United Kingdom the marriage proposal that had been made to France. According to the terms of the proposal, Louis XIV was to marry Princess Catarina upon a dowry of two million cruzados to which was added the possession of Tangier. Besides transferring the proposal to Charles II, the Count of Soure suggested as well that the marriage agreement with London included a second wedding ceremony, that of Charles II's sister, Henrietta Stuart, to Dom Afonso VI.
Such an understanding was contrary to the Spanish interests (the Spanish ambassador went as far as to threaten Charles II with war if the marriage took place) and met with the disapproval of other monarchies and members of the British Crown who tried to persuade Charles II to back out of the deal. Those against the union debased the Portuguese princess's physical appearance and child-bearing capability, pointed out alternative European princesses and looked for similar dowries. However, rumours concerning a supposed Anglo-Spanish agreement and the British monarch's refusal to wed Louis XIV's niece forced the French to support the Portuguese proposal, promising financial and military assistance, which may have proved decisive for Charles II's final resolution. In a clear demonstration of the vital importance that the agreement had for the Portuguese Crown, the Portuguese regent Queen, Dona Luísa de Gusmão, was prepared to make significant concessions in order to meet London's demands. One of the problems that emerged during the negotiations was the British insistence on taking possession of Tangier before the wedding ceremony. It was settled that the fleet tasked with taking the princess into British shores would first pass by that place and take possession of it; with regard to Bombay, it was agreed that a new Viceroy would be appointed and sent to Goa for the purpose of peacefully transferring that possession into British control. As the Queen feared public opinion's response when the content of the treaty became known, she ordered Gaspar Severim de Faria, the Secretary of State, to abstain from reading in the Council of State the clauses referring to the transference of the overseas possessions into British rule, to prevent them from being rejected. On 18 May 1661, Charles II informed Parliament of his marriage arrangement, and the ceremony took place the following year, on 31 May 1662. Dom Afonso VI's address to the organs of local government of the Portuguese cities and towns, as well as to the Senate of Lisbon (to whose members he asked the duplication of the municipal taxes on property for a two-year period of time as a means of covering the expenses pertaining to the wedding) revealed the Crown's multiple intentions underlying the treaty's celebration: to assure the Kingdom's safety in face of the Pyrenees Treaty of 1659 (a Franco-Spanish agreement which meant for Portugal the loss of an important European ally and a greater military and strategic ease on Spain's side with regard to the Iberian fight), to reinforce the Portuguese prestige in Europe, and to seek a peace settlement with the United Provinces, and if possible with the Hispanic monarchy, under British mediation.
The pressing question of the moment was how to pay for the princess's dowry. The Kingdom's financial solvency ranked very low and a dispute with some city organs over the already heavy fiscal and monetary policies, dating back to Dom João IV's reign, cast a gloomy prevision concerning public reaction to tax aggravation. In fact, it provoked popular discontent and caused the summoning of the Cortes in November 1661 (later cancelled). In this context, a diversity of resources was used in order to assemble the total sum of the dowry. For example, donations charged in sugar and in money were adopted in Brazil. However, all efforts proved insufficient to meet the needs. When the day of Dona Catarina's departure to England arrived, the agreed half of the total sum due for payment had not yet been collected. The Princess travelled to the United Kingdom with only 700 thousand cruzados, to which were added goods like sugar, jewels and silver pieces. As the treaty was not being respected, the marriage could have been annulled, but the British envoy, the Count of Sandwich, had already taken possession of Tangier and decided to carry things out as planned. The first part of the deal would only be settled after over one year passed by since the Queen's arrival in London, and the remaining outstanding debt took several decades to be settled.
The treaty between the two Crowns was signed on 23 June 1661 in Whitehall; it was ratified by Portugal on 28 August and by the United Kingdom on 20 September that year. The most relevant clauses in the treaty were the establishment of a two million cruzados dowry (the highest ever paid by a Portuguese infanta, art. 5), the concession of Tangier (art. 2) and Bombay (art. 11), "with all their rights, profits, territories and belongings" as well as the concession of privileges and commercial liberties to British traders in Portuguese overseas possessions (articles 12 and 13). The transference of Bombay into British control was held crucial to increase British presence in Asia as a means of providing Portugal with the necessary help to face "the strength and invasion" of the United Provinces. The new British Queen was granted freedom of cult (art. 7), as were all Portuguese inhabitants who decided to remain in Tangier (art. 3) and Bombay (art. 11). With regard to Estado da India, it was agreed to share possessions eventually re-conquered (art. 14). On the British monarch's side, there was a commitment to give military support to the Portuguese Crown through the provision of soldiers and ships paid by the Portuguese Royal Treasure department (articles 16 and 17), to avoid contacts with the Hispanic monarchy that might damage Portuguese interests (art. 18), and to mediate peace negotiations with the United Provinces. A secret article considered military support to Portugal in case the United Provinces refused the peace offer. Previous treaties celebrated by the two Crowns since 1641 were also confirmed and ratified (art.1), and the Queen was granted the right of thirty thousand pounds of annual income, even upon her husband's death and her subsequent return to Portugal (articles 8 and 10).
In addition to having received an important sum of money, the British aimed at developing their trade and expanding their overseas possessions. They were counting on the commercial supremacy of Portugal on vast regions of the world for the accomplishment of this goal. Their establishment in Bombay would in time prove essential for the development of the British Empire and marked the dawn of their rule in India. On the opposite side of this trend, Tangier was abandoned in 1684, and conquered by the Moroccan King.
By its turn, the Portuguese Crown secured an actual foreign support (and not only a circumstantial one, as had been customary till then), of vital importance for the purpose of defending its independence and for the outcome of the restoration war, when the celebration of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1659 weakened Portugal's positioning in Europe. The Treaty of 1661 marked thus the beginning of a clear foreign policy priority, with Portugal siding with the United Kingdom and therefore putting an end to years of solitary standing in Europe. The agreement helped to foster peace negotiations with the Hispanic monarchy, given the friendly terms of Anglo-Spanish relations at the time. In fact, conversations started shortly after, in 1663, although a conclusive agreement would not be achieved until 1668.
Notwithstanding all territorial losses and commercial concessions that it involved, the Treaty of 1661 was a necessary measure to ensure the preservation of Portuguese sovereignty in several overseas regions at the time. It belongs to a general restructuration context of the Portuguese Empire against the background of emerging European powers (like the United Provinces and the United Kingdom) moving within Portuguese zones of influence and sovereignty. It was therefore the solution found for preventing further losses.
Bibliography:
MACEDO, Jorge Borges de, História Diplomática Portuguesa: constantes e linhas de força, Lisboa, Revista Nação e Defesa, 1987. BRAZÃO, Eduardo, A Diplomacia Portuguesa nos Séculos XVII e XVIII, vol. I, Lisboa, Resistência, 1979-1980. PRESTAGE, Edgar, "The Treaties of 1642, 1654 and 1661", in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, Watford, Voss and Michael, 1935, pp. 130-151. MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, História diplomática de Portugal, Lisboa, Verbo, 1986.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva
The first steps towards the agreement occurred during the period that Francisco de Melo de Torres spent in London as an ambassador of the Portuguese kingdom (1657-1661), especially the late part of that embassy. Given the fact that the restored British monarchy didn't ratify the treaty of 28 April 1660 (through which the then ruling Council of State had agreed to help Portugal with armament and soldiers), the Portuguese ambassador tried to make out London's interest on marrying Charles II to infanta Dona Catarina. All negotiations and activities leading to the nuptial arrangement were set in motion with the utmost discretion. The Count of Soure, who was the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, suggested that Portugal should address to the United Kingdom the marriage proposal that had been made to France. According to the terms of the proposal, Louis XIV was to marry Princess Catarina upon a dowry of two million cruzados to which was added the possession of Tangier. Besides transferring the proposal to Charles II, the Count of Soure suggested as well that the marriage agreement with London included a second wedding ceremony, that of Charles II's sister, Henrietta Stuart, to Dom Afonso VI.
Such an understanding was contrary to the Spanish interests (the Spanish ambassador went as far as to threaten Charles II with war if the marriage took place) and met with the disapproval of other monarchies and members of the British Crown who tried to persuade Charles II to back out of the deal. Those against the union debased the Portuguese princess's physical appearance and child-bearing capability, pointed out alternative European princesses and looked for similar dowries. However, rumours concerning a supposed Anglo-Spanish agreement and the British monarch's refusal to wed Louis XIV's niece forced the French to support the Portuguese proposal, promising financial and military assistance, which may have proved decisive for Charles II's final resolution. In a clear demonstration of the vital importance that the agreement had for the Portuguese Crown, the Portuguese regent Queen, Dona Luísa de Gusmão, was prepared to make significant concessions in order to meet London's demands. One of the problems that emerged during the negotiations was the British insistence on taking possession of Tangier before the wedding ceremony. It was settled that the fleet tasked with taking the princess into British shores would first pass by that place and take possession of it; with regard to Bombay, it was agreed that a new Viceroy would be appointed and sent to Goa for the purpose of peacefully transferring that possession into British control. As the Queen feared public opinion's response when the content of the treaty became known, she ordered Gaspar Severim de Faria, the Secretary of State, to abstain from reading in the Council of State the clauses referring to the transference of the overseas possessions into British rule, to prevent them from being rejected. On 18 May 1661, Charles II informed Parliament of his marriage arrangement, and the ceremony took place the following year, on 31 May 1662. Dom Afonso VI's address to the organs of local government of the Portuguese cities and towns, as well as to the Senate of Lisbon (to whose members he asked the duplication of the municipal taxes on property for a two-year period of time as a means of covering the expenses pertaining to the wedding) revealed the Crown's multiple intentions underlying the treaty's celebration: to assure the Kingdom's safety in face of the Pyrenees Treaty of 1659 (a Franco-Spanish agreement which meant for Portugal the loss of an important European ally and a greater military and strategic ease on Spain's side with regard to the Iberian fight), to reinforce the Portuguese prestige in Europe, and to seek a peace settlement with the United Provinces, and if possible with the Hispanic monarchy, under British mediation.
The pressing question of the moment was how to pay for the princess's dowry. The Kingdom's financial solvency ranked very low and a dispute with some city organs over the already heavy fiscal and monetary policies, dating back to Dom João IV's reign, cast a gloomy prevision concerning public reaction to tax aggravation. In fact, it provoked popular discontent and caused the summoning of the Cortes in November 1661 (later cancelled). In this context, a diversity of resources was used in order to assemble the total sum of the dowry. For example, donations charged in sugar and in money were adopted in Brazil. However, all efforts proved insufficient to meet the needs. When the day of Dona Catarina's departure to England arrived, the agreed half of the total sum due for payment had not yet been collected. The Princess travelled to the United Kingdom with only 700 thousand cruzados, to which were added goods like sugar, jewels and silver pieces. As the treaty was not being respected, the marriage could have been annulled, but the British envoy, the Count of Sandwich, had already taken possession of Tangier and decided to carry things out as planned. The first part of the deal would only be settled after over one year passed by since the Queen's arrival in London, and the remaining outstanding debt took several decades to be settled.
The treaty between the two Crowns was signed on 23 June 1661 in Whitehall; it was ratified by Portugal on 28 August and by the United Kingdom on 20 September that year. The most relevant clauses in the treaty were the establishment of a two million cruzados dowry (the highest ever paid by a Portuguese infanta, art. 5), the concession of Tangier (art. 2) and Bombay (art. 11), "with all their rights, profits, territories and belongings" as well as the concession of privileges and commercial liberties to British traders in Portuguese overseas possessions (articles 12 and 13). The transference of Bombay into British control was held crucial to increase British presence in Asia as a means of providing Portugal with the necessary help to face "the strength and invasion" of the United Provinces. The new British Queen was granted freedom of cult (art. 7), as were all Portuguese inhabitants who decided to remain in Tangier (art. 3) and Bombay (art. 11). With regard to Estado da India, it was agreed to share possessions eventually re-conquered (art. 14). On the British monarch's side, there was a commitment to give military support to the Portuguese Crown through the provision of soldiers and ships paid by the Portuguese Royal Treasure department (articles 16 and 17), to avoid contacts with the Hispanic monarchy that might damage Portuguese interests (art. 18), and to mediate peace negotiations with the United Provinces. A secret article considered military support to Portugal in case the United Provinces refused the peace offer. Previous treaties celebrated by the two Crowns since 1641 were also confirmed and ratified (art.1), and the Queen was granted the right of thirty thousand pounds of annual income, even upon her husband's death and her subsequent return to Portugal (articles 8 and 10).
In addition to having received an important sum of money, the British aimed at developing their trade and expanding their overseas possessions. They were counting on the commercial supremacy of Portugal on vast regions of the world for the accomplishment of this goal. Their establishment in Bombay would in time prove essential for the development of the British Empire and marked the dawn of their rule in India. On the opposite side of this trend, Tangier was abandoned in 1684, and conquered by the Moroccan King.
By its turn, the Portuguese Crown secured an actual foreign support (and not only a circumstantial one, as had been customary till then), of vital importance for the purpose of defending its independence and for the outcome of the restoration war, when the celebration of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1659 weakened Portugal's positioning in Europe. The Treaty of 1661 marked thus the beginning of a clear foreign policy priority, with Portugal siding with the United Kingdom and therefore putting an end to years of solitary standing in Europe. The agreement helped to foster peace negotiations with the Hispanic monarchy, given the friendly terms of Anglo-Spanish relations at the time. In fact, conversations started shortly after, in 1663, although a conclusive agreement would not be achieved until 1668.
Notwithstanding all territorial losses and commercial concessions that it involved, the Treaty of 1661 was a necessary measure to ensure the preservation of Portuguese sovereignty in several overseas regions at the time. It belongs to a general restructuration context of the Portuguese Empire against the background of emerging European powers (like the United Provinces and the United Kingdom) moving within Portuguese zones of influence and sovereignty. It was therefore the solution found for preventing further losses.
Bibliography:
MACEDO, Jorge Borges de, História Diplomática Portuguesa: constantes e linhas de força, Lisboa, Revista Nação e Defesa, 1987. BRAZÃO, Eduardo, A Diplomacia Portuguesa nos Séculos XVII e XVIII, vol. I, Lisboa, Resistência, 1979-1980. PRESTAGE, Edgar, "The Treaties of 1642, 1654 and 1661", in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, Watford, Voss and Michael, 1935, pp. 130-151. MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, História diplomática de Portugal, Lisboa, Verbo, 1986.
Translated by: Leonor Sampaio da Silva